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We Can Act Only Under the Idea of Freedom in particular, is forever immune to revision, then there is no higher or firmer type of knowledge than that found in empirical natural science itself. There is no Archimedean point from which philosophy could hope to justify natural science from some better grounded and more certain perspective. The traditional dream of providing a philosophical justification for scientific knowledge must therefore be given up, and thus there is no longer any reason for attributing a special status and role to philosophy. A version of this last argument is the centerpiece of Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized." On the basis of the failure of Carnap's program for logically reconstructing science out of sensory experiences in Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Quine rejects the entire Carnapian enterprise of logical analysis or rational reconstruction as such:
But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe? The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anyone has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? Such a surrender of the epistemological burden to psychology is a move that was disallowed in earlier times as circular reasoning.
If the epistemologist's goal is validation of the grounds of empirical science, he defeats his purpose by using psychology or other empirical science in the validation. However, such scruples against circularity have little point once we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from observations.5
Given the failure of the Aufbau's program for logically translating all concepts of empirical science into purely sensory terms, Quine continues: "[l]t would seem more sensible to settle for psychology. Better to discover how science is in fact developed and learned than to fabricate a fictitious structure to a similar effect. 6 In the context of Carnap's actual motivations for his own program of logical reconstruction, however, this particular Quinean stratagem is extraordinarily misleading. For, in the first place, neither in the Aufbau nor in his later works did Carnap set himself the goal of grounding, justifying, or "validating" science from some supposedly higher and more certain philosophical vantage point. Indeed, Carnap himself was always perfectly happy to depend on the best results of current empirical research (he explicitly depends on the results of Gestalt psychology in the Aufbau, for example), so that the foundationally motivated strictures against circularity Quine rejects here were never part of Carnap's own motivations. And, in the second place, even after Carnap himself rejects the Aufbau's program of logically reconstructing science from a purely sensory basis, he nevertheless continues to emphasize, in even stronger and more insistent terms, that philosophy as he conceives it is an a priori or formal discipline whose special province is logical analysis rather than empirical investigation.7 Even if the particular logical reconstruction of science envisioned in the Aufbau cannot in fact be carried out, we can still devote ourselves to articulating the logical structure or logical framework within which empirical natural science proceeds. In this way, what Carnap is now calling Wissenschaftslogik is itself a purely logical or analytic discipline, wherein the correspondingly analytic formal scaffolding of synthetic or empirical natural science is to be clearly and precisely delineated. That the particular delineation attempted in the Aufbau cannot, for technical reasons, be carried out in no way undermines the general possibility of Wissenschaftslogik as such.
What does seriously challenge Carnap's characterization of philosophy as Wissenschaftslogik is Quine's attack on the first of the notorious "two dogmas of empiricism"-the doctrine, that is, that there is a clear and sharp distinction between formal, logical, or analytic truth, on the one side, and factual, empirical, or synthetic truth, on the other. The second "dogma of empiricism" is of course the doctrine of what Quine calls "radical reductionism"-the doctrine that each individual statement of natural science has its own particular range of confirmational sensory experiences via an Aufbau-style logical translation. This doctrine is of course threatened by Duhemian epistemological holism, but it is not, pace Quine, identical to the analytic/synthetic distinction.8 Indeed, in the period when Carnap puts the most weight on the analytic/synthetic distinction and the accompanying idea of philosophy as Wissenschaftslogik, Carnap himself explicitly adopts epistemological holism (which he associates with the names of Duhem and Poincar6). Accordingly, Carnap himself explicitly maintains that any statement of science-even the statements of logic and mathematics-can be revised in response to problematic empirical evidence, and thus Carnap himself explicitly maintains that no statement of science is forever immune to revision.9 It is just that for Carnap, in contrast to Quine, there remains, nonetheless, a sharp distinction between revisions of language or linguistic framework, in which analytic statements depending solely on the meanings of the relevant terms are revised, and factual revisions within a given language or framework, in which synthetic statements expressing contentful assertions about the empirical world are revised. Now Quine's attack on the notion of analytic truth-on the notion of truth in virtue of meaning-does (despite its confusion with his attack on the doctrine of radical reductionism) pose a serious challenge to Carnap's formulation of the distinction between revisions of linguistic framework, on the one side, and factual revisions of empirical statements formulated within a given framework, on the other.10 Quine's attack on the notion of analytic truth thus challenges both Carnap's explanation of the special a priori status of logic and mathematics (as truths flowing simply from the adoption of a given linguistic framework) and Carnap's explanation of the special, non-empirical status of philosophy (as a branch of applied logic, as Wissenschaftslogik). So it is this attack-not the idea of epistemological holism and the doctrine that no statement of science is immune to revision-that provides the strongest support for contemporary philosophical naturalism. Indeed, as we have just seen, epistemological holism and the rejection of all absolute unrevisability is perfectly compatible, in Carnap's own hands, with both a sharp distinction between a priori and empirical "entrenchment" here, does it really make sense to envision a process of empirical testing in which even this mathematical background somehow equally faces the "tribunal of experience"? I submit that this way of looking at the matter does not make sense-and not simply because no sane physicist or mathematician would describe the situation in this way. The fundamental problem is that general relativity is not happily viewed as something like a large conjunction, such that one conjunct is given by Einstein's field equations, another conjunct is given by the Kleinian theory of transformation groups, and a third conjunct is given by the Riemannian theory of manifolds-where we then view Eddington's experimental results, say, as potentially spreading empirical confirmation over the entire conjunction.15 Rather, the mathematical background of Einstein's theory functions as a necessary presupposition of that theory, as a means of representation or a language, as it were, without which the theory could not even be formulated or envisioned as a possibility in the first place.
To see this, let us first consider the situation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during the heyday of the Newtonian theory of gravitation. In this context, the modern concept of space-time simply does not exist. Space is represented by a three-dimensional geometry (Euclidean geometry is of course the only possibility), time is an entirely separate independent variable used to parametrize three-dimensional spatial trajectories, and gravitation is represented by a three-dimensional force acting immediately across arbitrary three-dimensional spatial distances. In this context, the general theory of relativity could not even be formulated, let alone be subject to empirical test. It is not that Newton's theory is adopted in preference to Einstein's on the basis of the then available evidence; the latter theory simply does not yet belong among the conceivable alternatives. Conversely, let us now consider the situation from the point of view of the space-time physics of the twentieth century. In this context, we see that we can now formulate all the theories of interest to us here-Newtonian physics, special relativity, general relativity-within the same four-dimensional language. Newtonian physics, too, can now be represented as a space-time theory, postulating a different structure for space-time-one containing counterparts of absolute time and absolute space-from that postulated by either special relativity or general relativity. Indeed, as the mathematician Elie Cartan showed in the 1920s, we can even formulate Newtonian gravitation theory using variably curved space-time, just as in general relativity. From this point of view it is then crystal clear that the mathematical machinery within which the concept of curved space-time is formulated is part of the means of representation or language of general relativity and not part of its He argued, in this context, that the great lesson of the theory of relativity is that the former meaning must be dropped while the latter must be retained. Relativity theory, that is, involves a priori constitutive principles as necessary presuppositions just as much as does Newtonian physics; it is just that mathematical physics has changed its constitutive principles in the transition from the latter theory to the former one. And it was Carnap who brought this new, relativized and dynamical conception of the a priori to its most precise expression via his formally characterized distinction, briefly noted above, between revision of language or linguistic framework, on the one side, and revision of empirical statements formulated within a given linguistic framework, on the other.
As we also observed above, Quinean considerations about revisability and epistemological holism do not, by themselves, touch this new conception of the a priori in the slightest. Indeed, revolutionary scientific changes, wherein the very background framework or language within which empirical scientific theories are formulated itself undergoes radical transformation, provide this conception with its primary motivation and its strongest corroboration. In the case of the radical -PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, 71:2 -conceptual transformation culminating in the theory of relativity, for example, we see that both mathematics and mathematical physics have undergone profound revolutionary changes. Nevertheless, although these two sequences of developments-mathematical and physical-indeed come together in a striking and dramatic fashion in the physical theory of general relativity, they still remain separate and distinct sequences evolving according to their own characteristic dynamics. The mathematical developments are driven largely by considerations of conceptual generalization and unification internal to mathematics, togetherwith fruitful new results obtainable within mathematics by purely mathematical methods-methods which of course involve no appeal whatsoever to experimental or observational testing-whereas the developments in physics, by contrast, are self-consciously driven by precise experimental results. And in all this the mathematical developments constitute the necessary presupposition or condition of possibility of the physical developments, in that the formulation and precise experimental confirmation of the latter would not even be possible in the first place without the former. It is no wonder, then, that we find in Thomas Kuhn's theory of the nature and character of scientific revolutions-in the central Kuhnian distinction between change of paradigm, on the one side, and normal science, on the other-an informal counterpart of Carnap's formalized distinction between change of language or linguistic framework and rule-governed operations carried out within such a framework.18 Although Carnap's particular formalization has not in fact survived, the historical and philosophical relevance of this distinction for properly understanding the nature and evolution of modern natural science has in no way been thereby diminished.
We can deepen and generalize our appreciation of the characteristically constitutive role of mathematics within modern natural science, finally, by glancing back briefly at the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which initiated it. For it was at this point, in the work of such thinkers as We have seen that the idea of a special a priori role for the mathematical disciplines in our natural scientific knowledge is alive and well in post-Newtonian mathematical physics and post-Kantian scientific philosophy. This idea has nothing to do with a jejune obsession with epistemic certainty, unshakable foundations, or absolute unrevisability. On the contrary, it is motivated throughout by an appreciation of the manifold possibilities for development, growth, and radical transformation in both pure mathematics and mathematical natural science-and by an appreciation, above all, of the striking and unexpected ways in which these two types of developments can influence and even merge with one another in the course of revolutionary conceptual changes such as those exemplified in the theory of relativity. It remains important, nonetheless, to recognize that mathematical conceptual revolutions and physical conceptual revolutions are not the same-and, in particular, that, in precisely such cases as the theory of relativity, mathematics, however revolutionary in content, continues to function as a means of representation or condition of possibility for the physical principles which are thereby subject to exact empirical tests. We have also seen that all of these ideas are given precise logical expression in the philosophy of formal languages or linguistic frameworks developed by Carnap, a philosophy which, as we noted at the very beginning, is in no way motivated by traditional concerns for certainty, justification, or philosophical "validation." And, whereas Carnap's repeated attempts to fashion an explicit logical characterization or explication of the distinction between a priori and empirical truth have indeed fallen prey to Quine's penetrating attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, it does not follow that we should simply close our eyes to the historical realities of scientific practice on behalf of a blandly undifferentiated philosophical holism.
If post-Kantian scientific philosophy no longer aims at supplying a foundation or "validation" of scientific practice, however, then what role remains left for it? Are we not faced, once again, with the idea that philosophy, as a discipline, should simply be absorbed into empirical natural science-that it should, for example, become that branch of the empirical study of actual human beings where, in Quine's words, "[w]e are after an understanding of science as an institution or process in the world, and we do not intend that understanding to be any better than the science which is its object?"21 Here, I believe, we can again derive an important clue from the Carnapian distinction between change of linguistic framework and rule-governed operations within a given such framework-the distinction, in other words, between what Carnap calls external and internal questions. For Carnap held that it is the characteristic fate of philosophy to be entangled with external questions-with questions, in particular, about which linguistic framework should be adopted for the total language of science. Such questions, Carnap further held, can in no way be settled by theoretical considerations, by either rules of evidence and confirmation characteristic of factual or empirical science or rules of deduction and proof characteristic of formal or mathematical science. External questions considered in philosophy are therefore purely practical questions, and, as such, they are -PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, 71:2 -answered, not by theoretical assertions, but by practical proposals to adopt one or another form of language.
I would put the guiding thought behind this Carnapian characterization of the peculiar role of philosophy as follows. In empirical natural science, as we have seen, we proceed against a background of concepts and principles-typically, mathematical concepts and principles-which constitute the framework or language of our inquiry. In particular, these concepts and principles make the rigorous formulation and testing of particular empirical hypotheses first possible, and, in this sense, they help to define what success or failure within this inquiry amount to. As such, the background framework in question contributes to the norms and standards of the discipline-norms and standards which, in the normal course of affairs, are generally taken for granted by the practitioners of the discipline. (In Kuhnian language, then, we are here concerned with elements of a paradigm definitive of a particular part or episode of normal science.) In pure mathematics, too, we typically operate against the background of generally agreed upon definitional stipulations and methods of proof-which, in a Carnapian-style rational reconstruction, would appear as primitive vocabulary, primitive axioms, and primitive rules of inference. And, in both cases, it is precisely the presence of such a generally agreed upon and taken for granted background that makes possible an inquiry we can honorifically characterize as "scientific"-that is, as progressive, as problem solving, and as capable of wide if not universal consensus.
It may also happen, however, that we have occasion to step back and reflect upon such a taken for granted background of disciplinary norms and standards. We may have occasion, that is, to call such norms and standards into question and to ask ourselves why precisely these concepts and principles should govern our inquiry. Indeed, during periods of deep revolutionary change it is just such questions that come to the foreground. Older constitutive principles (in Kuhnian terms, older paradigms) are challenged, new constitutive principles (in Kuhnian terms, new paradigms) are suggested. As Carnap would put it, we are now faced with an external question concerning the replacement of one linguistic framework by another. How, then, can we decide such a question? We cannot, by definition, appeal any longer to a generally agreed upon and taken for granted constitutive background, for it is just such a background that has now been called into question. We are thus no longer dealing with purely scientific questions in the above sense-that is, we are no longer operating wholly within what Kuhn calls normal science-and it is precisely here that characteristically philosophical considerations come into play.
Let us illustrate these ideas with a couple of examples. Consider first the revolutionary conceptual changes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which initiated modern natural science as we know it. These events certainly involved a number of instances of striking empirical success in providing exact mathematical representations of nature in the modern style-notably, Kepler's new planetary astronomy (building, to be sure, on a long mathematical tradition) and Galileo's mathematical description of projectile motion (which was, in its own right, almost entirely new). Nevertheless, the ambitions of this new intellectual movement far exceeded its grasp. For one here aimed at nothing less than a precise mathematical description of all of the phenomena of nature, to be achieved by an atomistic or corpuscular theory of matter that reduced all natural changes to the motions and mutual impacts of the constituent particles. And nothing even approximating such an atomistic reduction was actually achieved until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-when, we might add, it was achieved using entirely new and hitherto entirely unforeseen mathematical and physical concepts. So it was not simply empirical and mathematical success in the modern style that motivated and sustained this intellectual movement. On the contrary, during its first fifty years especially, the intellectual movement which initiated modern natural science supported itself, above all, on the new system of natural philosophy fashioned by Descartes-a philosophy which not only sketched a complete program for a new, geometrical physics, but which also undertook the task of radically revising and reorganizing the wider system of philosophical concepts and principles bequeathed to western thought by Scholasticism (involving such concepts as substance, force, space, time, matter, mind, creation, divinity). Virtually all of the important thinkers of the period-for example, Huygens, Leibniz, and even Newton-began their intellectual careers as disciples of this new philosophical system. And, if they were later radically to revise or even to reject it, it still cast a long and indelible shadow across their own intellectual contributions-to such an extent, in fact, that these contributions are almost impossible to conceive except against this Cartesian background.
For a second example, consider once again the relativistic revolution in physics wrought by Einstein. It is well known that purely empirical considerations played a decidedly secondary role here. Not only did Einstein entirely ignore the celebrated experiment of Michelson and Morley in his 1905 paper on special relativity, but there was on the scene a fully developed competitor theory-the Lorentz-Fitzgerald "aether" theory-which was empirically equivalent to Einstein's theory. Einstein himself cites a variety of philosophical influences on his thinking-including, especially, the "critical" and "skeptical" philosophies of Hume and Mach.22 With the benefit of hindsight, however, we can say that the philosophical ideas of the great French mathematician and mathematical physicist Henri Poincare (who was of course deeply involved with the problems in electrodynamics addressed by special relativity and who Einstein was intensively reading at the time) were of perhaps even more importance.23 For Poincar6 had arrived, on the basis of his own fundamental mathematical work on non-Euclidean geometry, at the idea that geometry is neither (pace Kant) a synthetic a priori product of pure intuition nor (pace Gauss and Helmholtz) a straightforward empirical description of what we can experience in nature. Establishing one or another system of geometry, according to Poincare, rather requires a free choice, a convention of our own in order to bridge the irreducible gulf between our crude and approximate sensory experience and our precise mathematical descriptions of nature. There is no doubt that Einstein found this idea to be tremendously liberating, and it appears that it was this idea, above all, that stimulated him to view the concept of simultaneity, not as a simple datum of immediate intuition or experience, but rather as something to be fixed axiomatically by definition as part of the framework of a new proposed kinematics.24 Although Einstein was later, through his work on the general theory, to move decisively beyond Poincare's conventionalist philosophy of geometry, it is, once again, almost impossible to conceive Einstein's initial liberating move without this philosophical background. Philosophy does not function, in such cases of fundamental conceptual transformation, as a firmer or more certain source of knowledge which we can then use to justify or "validate" the scientific changes in question. Nor does it proceed in splendid isolation, independent of the scientific developments themselves. Descartes was motivated in his new system of natural philosophy by earlier scientific discoveries-notably, by Copernican astronomy and by his own discovery of what we now call analytic geometry. Poincare, as we just observed, was motivated by his own purely mathematical work in non-Euclidean geometry and was himself deeply involved with the newly emerging foundations of electrodynamics. Philosophy rather functions here at one level removed, as it were, from conceptual transformations within the sciences. It operates in an environment where a new constitutive framework (a new scientific paradigm) is not yet in place, and it suggests ideas, concepts, principles, and programs-typically of a less precise but more general character than the scientific constitutive frameworks themselves-which can motivate and support the pursuit of one such constitutive framework rather than another. In this sense, if scientific conceptual revolutions take place at one level removed from what Kuhn calls normal science, philosophy operates rather at two levels removed.
Carnap characterizes the answers we might reasonably attempt to give to philosophical questions as both conventional and purely pragmatic. He thereby emphasizes the element of free decision-that we are here not bound by fixed and antecedently agreed upon rules-as well as the fundamentally practical character of such questions-that, as a consequence, we are governed by standards of utility and expediency rather than truth. To this I would add the proviso that standards of utility and expediency are themselves often at issue in such cases-that the real problem is often to decide what we will now count as fruitful or successful. Our problem is rationally to negotiate new standards or ideals of fruitfulness and success, and not simply to estimate the probabilities of achieving already clear and agreed upon goals on the basis of accepted empirical results. I would also add a fundamentally historical dimension to our understanding of philosophical theorizing. In formulating new philosophical ideals we typically react to, and operate against the background of, previous philosophical ideals-as Descartes operated against the background of Scholastic natural philosophy or Poincare operated against the background of both Kantianism and empiricism. Philosophy thus not only functions at a different level than the scientific disciplines, but also within its own characteristic intellectual context.
Lying at the basis of contemporary philosophical naturalism is the Quinean picture of the totality of human knowledge with which we began. Our knowledge is pictured as a vast web of beliefs, which responds as a total system to the impact of sense experience along the periphery, and within which, accordingly, the only relevant distinctions we can make involve degrees of centrality and thus of entrenchment. Let me suggest, as an alternative, the picture of a dynamical system of beliefs, concepts, and principles that can be analyzed, for present purposes, into three main components: an evolving system of empirical natural scientific concepts and principles, an evolving system of mathematical concepts and principles which frame those of empirical natural science and make their rigorous formulation and precise experimental testing possible, and an evolving system of philosophical concepts and principles which serve, especially in periods of conceptual revolution, as a source of suggestions and guidance in choosing one scientific framework rather than another. All of these systems are in continual dynamical evolution, and it is indeed the case that no concept or principle is forever immune to revision. Yet we can nonetheless clearly distinguish the radically different functions, levels, and roles of the differing component systems. 
